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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78A-4-103. 
CONSTITIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
There are no constitutional provisions which apply to this appeal. The relevant 
statutory provisions are limited to Utah Code Annotated §30-1-4.5. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Richards commenced this action by filing a Verified Petition for Paternity and 
Related Matters on December 21, 2006. (R. 1-8). 
2. In the Verified Petition for Paternity and Related Matters, Richards alleged in the 
relevant part: 
a. The parties had never been married (R. 1); 
b. The parties continually resided together for over 10 years seeking an 
order establishing a common law marriage pursuant to UCA §30-1-4.5 
(R. 3); 
c. The parties cohabitated from May 1995 until their separation in early 
2006 (R. 3); 
d. The parties are both of legal age and capable of giving consent (R. 3); 
e. The parties have held themselves out and acquired a reputation as 
husband and wife (R. 4); 
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f. The Court should find the parties established a common law marriage 
and enter appropriate orders concerning custody, child support, and 
property divisions (R. 4-5); and 
g. The Court should make an equitable division of the residential property 
awarding Richards a financial interest in the property representing his 
reasonable investment based on the parties' partnership, implied 
contract, or constructive trust (R. 6). 
3. On January 10, 2007, Brown filed her Answer to the Verified Petition for 
Paternity and Related Matters. (R. 28-38). 
4. In her Answer, Brown responded to the allegations, in the relevant part, by: 
a. Admitting the parties were never married (R. 28); 
b. Affirmatively denying that the parties separated in early 2006, alleging 
the parties separated in August, 2005 and therefore do not meet the 
cohabitation element for the establishment of a common law marriage 
(R. 29); and 
c. Denial of all relief requested by Richards relating to any property and 
affirmatively alleging there was no property to be divided (R. 30). 
5. On June 19, 2007, Richards filed his Certificate of Readiness for Trial wherein he 
certified that "counsel has completed all discovery; that opposing counsel has had 
reasonable time to pursue discovery; and that all discovery of record has been 
completed." (R. 41-42). 
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6. On June 19, 2007, Richards filed a financial declaration wherein he averred that he 
owned no interests in any real property. (R. 43-55). 
7. On August 8, 2007, Brown filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment relating 
to whether Richards timely filed his request for the establishment of a common 
law marriage. (R. 72-81). 
8. On August 8, 2007, Brown filed her Affidavit of Diana Brown in Support of 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, wherein she alleged: 
a. She purchased the home on 459 12 Avenue in December, 1989. (R. 82); 
b. She and Richards began residing together in May, 1995. (R. 82); 
c. They cohabitated until the summer of 2001 when they moved into separate 
bedrooms and completely terminated all sexual relations with one another. (R. 
83); 
d. Richards moved out of the residence at the end of August, 2005 and took up 
residence at 635 K Street where he continued to reside. (R. 83); and 
e. The Verified Petition filed in December, 2006 was more than one year after 
they separated in August, 2005. (R. 83). 
9. On September 5, 2007, Richards filed his Response to Respondent's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment. (R. 87-93). 
10. Richards did not file an affidavit in support of his Response to Respondent's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
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11. On September 5, 2007, the Honorable Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett 
recommended that the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment be granted. (R. 94). 
12. On September 10, 2007, Richards filed his Objection to Commissioner's 
Recommendation. (R. 95-99). 
13. On October 15, 2007, the Court entered its Order on Motion for Partial i 
Judgment. (R. 110-113). 
14. On January 9, 2008, the Court entered its Memorandum Decision on Richards 
Objection to Commissioner's Recommendation, thereby denying the objection. 
(R. 121-123). 
15. In the Memorandum Decision, the Court relied on Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 
669 (Utah 1985) for a definition of "cohabitation" which included common 
residency and sexual contact evidencing a conjugal association. The Court found 
that it was undisputed that the parties terminated all sexual contact in 2001 and 
Richards moved out of the residence in September, 2005. The Court found 
Richards had one year from the date of the termination of the common law 
marriage to file his Petition and his petition was not timely filed. (R. 121-123). 
16. On March 24, 2008, despite having previously filed a Certificate of Readiness for 
Trial asserting that all discovery had been completed, Richards filed his Certificate 
of Service of Petitioner's First Set of Interrogatories, Request for Production of 
Documents and Admissions to Respondent. (R. 130-131). 
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17. On May 1, 2008, Brown filed a Certificate of Mailing Respondent's Answers to 
Petitioner's First Set of Interrogatories, Request for Production of Documents and 
Admissions to Respondent. (R. 139-140). 
18. On May 1, 2008, Brown filed a Motion for Protective Order, Memorandum in 
Support, and an Attorney Certification RE: Motion for Protective Order, asserting 
that many of the discovery requests relate to matters previously decided on the 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (R. 141-154). 
19. After full briefing, on June 9, 2008, the Court entered its Minute Entry granting 
the Motion for Protective Order. (R. 193-195). 
20. As a basis for granting the Motion for Protective Order, the Court found that: 
a. Richards failed to perform his obligations to meet and confer pursuant 
to Rule 26(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and therefore was not 
entitled to pursue discovery. (R. 194); and 
b. the matter was set for trial in two weeks. (R. 194). 
21. The action came before the Court on a bench trial on June 16, 2008, with all trial 
exhibits presented to the Court based on stipulation and the parties as the only 
witnesses testifying. (R. 225-226). 
22. Richards testified. (R. 262). (The references to the transcript hereinafter will be 
designated "Tr."). 
23. Richards admitted that at all times his marital status has been single. (Tr. P. 12, L. 
22-23). 
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24. However, the parties lived together from May 1995 to August 2005 as 
longstanding romantic partners. (Tr. 14, L. 3-6). 
25. Brown owned the home in which the parties resided having acquired the residence 
in approximately 1989. (Tr. P. 15, L. 4-10). 
26. At the time of the parties' separation in August, 2005, Richards moved into a 
separate residence approximately six blocks from where he resided with Brown in 
the Avenues. (Tr. P. 16, L. 8-20). 
27. After Richards moved out, the parties maintained a cooperative relationship so far 
as it concerned their daughter, including maintaining family celebrations. (Tr. P. 
17, L. 7-11). 
28. After the separation, Richards maintained a unilateral hope for reconciliation. (Tr. 
P. 18, L. 7-10). 
29. In October, 2005, approximately two months after the parties separated, they 
engaged in mediation and resolved all issues relating to parenting by adopting a 
parenting plan, but did not address financial issues because the parties allotted 
time for mediation expired and Brown refused to return to mediation. (Tr. P. 21, 
L. 15 to P. 22, L. 10). 
30. In explaining why he did not file his petition for establishment of a common law 
marriage within one year of the date of the parties' separation, Richards professed 
ignorance of that requirement in the law. (Tr. P. 24, L. 21-23). 
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31. Richards believed he had an interest in the residence based on his financial 
contributions to the mortgage, maintenance expenses, and improvements. (Tr. P. 
25, L. 6-16). 
32. Initially, Richards paid $400 per month toward the mortgage. (Tr. P. 26, L. 1-4). 
33. Thereafter, he voluntarily increased that amount to $550 per month after the birth 
of the parties' daughter. At the time Richards was paying $550 per month, the 
mortgage was over $1,500.00 per month. (Tr. P. 26, L. 5-10). 
34. Over the ten year period Richards resided with Brown, he paid $71,100.00 
towards the mortgage. (Tr. P. 28, L. 1-5 and P. 67, L. 9-12). 
35.Neither Richards nor Brown owned any other real property. (Tr. P. 28, L. 17-19). 
36. During the period of common residency, the parties' income was close to equal. 
(Tr.P.29,L. 11-19). 
37. The parties never had a joint bank account. (Tr. P. 29, L. 23-24). 
38. While Richards listed Brown as his beneficiary on his life insurance, in contrast 
Brown listed the parties' minor daughter as her beneficiary. (Tr. P. 30, L. 2-9). 
39. During their common residency, each party paid their own personal expenses, but 
as to household expenses, they tallied them up and then reconciled who owed what 
to whom based on who spent what during that accounting period. (Tr. P. 30, L. 10 
to P. 31, L. 2). 
40. Richards stated his understanding was that if the parties' relationship terminated, 
Brown would reimburse him for some equity in the house. (Tr. P. 36, L. 9-17). 
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41. At no time was there a written agreement between the parties concerning the 
house. (Tr.P. 37,L. 6-10). 
42. Richards contributed to the household maintenance costs. (Tr. P. 38, L. 6-20). 
43. Richards testified the appraised value of the house in March, 2008, three years 
after the parties' separation, was $425,000.00 and the mortgage balance was 
$148,000.00 at the time he moved into the residence, leaving a total equity in the 
property of $277,000.00 of which sixty six percent (66%) was subject to division 
in this action. (Tr. P. 42, L. 7 to P. 43, L. 3). 
44. Richards testified that he made approximately $10,485.00 worth of capital 
improvements to the house including the cost of the construction of a deck. (Tr. P. 
46, L. 3-25). 
45. Richards conceded that Brown made capital improvements to the house to which 
he did not contribute toward their cost. (Tr. P. 48, L. 4 to P. 49, L. 9). 
46. With respect to those capital improvement contributions, Richards admitted that 
had he desired to be reimbursed during the period of the parties' relationship, he 
could have asked for such reimbursement and Brown probably would have agreed. 
(Tr.P.49,L. 10-19). 
47. Richards testified that annually the parties discussed his desire to be placed on title 
to the house, but that the discussions never reached any level of detail. (Tr. P. 50, 
51, and 53). 
12 
48. Richards owned and maintained the only vehicle the parties used during their 
relationship. However, Brown generally used public transportation for her own 
individual transportation needs. (Tr. P. 55, L. 20 to P. 56, L. 23). 
49. Richards asserted a claim for one half of all automobile expenses he incurred 
during the decade of the parties' relationship. (Tr. P. 58). 
50. Richards admitted there was no appraisal as to the value of the house on the date 
he moved into the residence. (Tr. P. 63, L. 3-20). 
51. Richards never paid an amount which equaled one half of the monthly mortgage 
payments. (Tr. P. 68, L. 7-9). 
52. Richards did not have the house appraised when he moved out in August, 2005, 
waiting until March, 2008 to have such an appraisal performed. (Tr. P. 69, L. 22-
25 and P. 70, L. 11-12). 
53. At the time of the trial, Richards was renting a home in the Avenues for $750 per 
month. (Tr. P. 75, L. 4-6). 
54. Brown admitted the parties discussed Richards' desire for an equity interest in the 
home, but Brown conditioned any such equity position on Richards buying that 
position by paying her one half of the equity in the home at the time of his being 
put on to title. (Tr. P. 97, L. 16-19 and P. 98, L. 7-13). 
55. Brown did not have an appraisal of the home done at the time of her divorce from 
her husband Mr. Priest, leaving it to a mortgage company to calculate the equity in 
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the property at the time of that divorce being entered in approximately 1991. (Tr. 
P. 115, L. 20-25). 
56. Brown testified that no appraisal was performed when Richards moved into the 
residence in May, 1995. (Tr. P. 116, L. 6-9). 
57. When Richards was paying $400 per month, the mortgage on the home was 
$1,187.00. (Tr.P. 116,L. 10-13). 
58. The parties terminated all sexual relations in 2001, when their daughter was four 
years old, and Richards moved into a separate bedroom within the house which 
was located on an entirely different floor in the house than Brown's bedroom. (Tr. 
P. 118, L. 16 to P. 119,L. 15). 
59. When questioned by the Court, Richards admitted that some percentage of the 
money he paid toward the rent would have been used to pay rent elsewhere had he 
not been residing with Brown. (Tr. P. 138, L. 3-26). 
60. During Richards closing argument, the Court noted that unjust enrichment is a 
restitutionary remedy which does not include a claim for appreciation. (Tr. P. 143, 
L. 40 to P. 144, L. 8). 
61. During his closing Richards admitted there was no meeting of the minds 
concerning his investment in the house. (Tr. P. 149, L. 15-17 and P. 151, L. 14-
18). 
62. Richards conceded the theory of constructive trust did not apply. (Tr. P. 161, L. 8-
9). 
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63. Richards admitted that there was no evidence presented concerning some of the 
elements of promissory estoppels. (Tr. P. 163, L. 4-16). 
64. Richards conceded there was no implied in fact contract, arguing despite the lack 
of evidence concerning some of the elements of promissory estoppels his only two 
remaining claims were for unjust enrichment and promissory estoppel. (Tr. P. 
164, L. 14 to P. 165, L. 16). 
65. After taking the matter under advisement, on July 9, 2008, the Court issued its 
Finding of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. (R. 228-251). 
66. The Court entered the following Findings of Fact: 
a. The parties never married but began living together in 1995 and a daughter was 
born on March 29, 1996. (R. 228, Finding #1); 
b. During the ten years they resided together, they did so in a house owned by 
Brown which she received as part of her prior divorce settlement from Erik 
Priest on or about September, 1991. During that divorce proceeding, the 
parties "figured out" their equity in the house and the Brown paid off Mr. 
Priest's equity in the house. (R. 228-229, Finding #2); 
c. The parties separated in August 2005 when Richards moved out of the house 
and rented an apartment six blocks away, paying a monthly rent of $750 per 
month. (R. 229, Finding #3); 
d. Shortly after the separation, the parties mediated and resolved all issues 
relating to the minor child. Richards expected to return to mediation to discuss 
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financial issues, but Brown refused. As a result of these delays, Richards did 
not file his petition for the establishment of marriage until December 26, 2006, 
more than one year after the Petitioner moved out of the residence. (R. 229, 
Finding # 4); 
e. Petitioner's Verified Petition stated three claims for relief including a 
declaration of paternity coupled with joint legal and physical custody, 
declaration of a common law marriage, and equitable distribution of property 
based on theories of partnership, implied contract for services and/or 
constructive trust. (R. 229-230, Finding #5); 
f. Brown stipulated to the custody issues but disputed the timeliness of the 
Petition for declaration of a common law marriage and jurisdiction of the Court 
to divide the property. (R. 230, Finding #6); 
g. The parties stipulated to the temporary orders relating to the child were to 
become permanent, leaving for trial issues relating to property. (R. 230, 
Finding # 7); 
h. Respondent brought a motion for partial summary judgment declaring the 
petition for declaration of a common law marriage was untimely. The 
commissioner agreed and recommended the motion be granted. Richards 
objected. The Court affirmed the Commissioner's recommendation. (R. 230, 
Finding # 8). 
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i. The parties are both trained nurses who met while Brown was still married and 
were friends. Eventually, Brown was divorced and several years later, the 
parties began living together. Their respective incomes were comparable. (R. 
230-231, Finding #9); 
j . The parties never had joint bank accounts, but Brown kept detailed written 
twice monthly tallies of expenditures incurred. The parties practice was that 
after tallying the expenditures, they would equalize who paid for what through 
reimbursement. (R. 231, Finding #10); 
k. The tallies were not exhaustive and did not include all of the expenditures 
incurred, but they accurately depicted their financial practices. Richards 
testified that among the expenditures which were not "tallied" included his 
expenditure of $8,895.00 to replace a deck, $312.00 towards a sprinkler 
system, and $179.00 toward the purchase of a new ceiling fan. (R. 231-232, 
Finding #11); 
1. Richards testified when he first moved in, he paid $400 per month towards the 
mortgage and when their daughter was born he voluntarily increased the 
amount paid to $550 per month. When he got a raise, he increased the amount 
to $650 per month. On occasion, he wrote the check directly to the mortgage 
company. (R. 232, Finding 12); 
m. While Richards acknowledged his payments were less than half the mortgage, 
he was making other contributions to equalize the parties' expenditures, 
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including his provision of the only vehicle used by the parties which he 
brought into the relationship. Brown admitted that Richards' financial 
contributions approximately equaled her contributions. (R. 232-233, Finding 
13); 
n. The Court did not accept Brown's testimony the payments constituted rent. (R. 
233, Finding #14); 
o. At the time Richards moved in with Brown, her mortgage was $1187.00 per 
month. The amount increased over the period of the ten year common 
residency to $1,516.00. Further, due to refinancing, over the course of the 
relationship, the mortgage balance increased rather than decreased. (R. 233-
234, Finding 15); 
p. Richards testified he felt insecure about his financial position with respect to 
equity in the house and that during the relationship Brown represented that if 
the relationship terminated, he would be treated the same as was her husband 
in the prior divorce proceeding. Richards believed that he and Brown had an 
agreement concerning the equity in the property. (R. 234-235, Finding #16); 
q. Brown testified the parties did have discussion concerning the equity in the 
house, but stated that all such discussions were conditioned upon Richards 
paying one half of the then existing equity. Richards denied having any 
recollection of such conditions. (R. 235, Finding #17); 
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r. Brown acknowledged it was important to Richards to have his name on title, 
but testified she believed that he failed to take advantage of the opportunity 
after two refinances during the relationship, and admitted that she never 
provided him with an amount necessary to pay out one half of the equity. 
Finally, Brown admitted she never seriously pursued any efforts to put 
Richards on title. (R. 235, Finding #18); 
s. The parties admitted that over the course of their relationship, the issue of 
Richards being on title increased the contention in the relationship. Richards 
testified that had he known he was not going to be put on title, he would have 
made other financial choices. Brown admitted that had Richards paid her one 
half of the equity, she would have put him on title. Finally, Brown stated as 
the parties relationship difficulties increased, her desire to put Richards on title 
lessened. (R. 236, Finding #19); 
t. The Court found Brown had a greater understanding of what was entailed 
when parties split up based on her involvement in a prior divorce proceeding. 
(R. 236, Finding #20); 
u. The Court found that as difficulties mounted between the parties, Brown never 
clearly conveyed her position with respect to what interest in the home, if any, 
she was willing to convey to Richards. (R. 236-237, Finding # 21); 
v. Richards never took the steps necessary to clarify his position nor secure his 
interest in the residence. He never took steps to have the home appraised and 
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therefore there was no information before the Court to assess how his 
contributions enhanced the value of the home. During the period of 
cohabitation, Brown twice refinanced the house and Richards chose not to take 
those opportunities to resolve his concerns one way or the other. (R. 237, 
Finding #22); 
w. The parties had difficulties in 2001, which exacerbated by their dispute over 
the house. They slept in different parts of the house. The parties intimate 
relationship terminated around that time. (R. 237-238, Finding #23); 
x. As part of these proceedings, the home was appraised on March 17, 2008 
which concluded the present market value is $425,000. (R. 238, Finding #25); 
y. While the Court had the present value of the home as evidence before it, there 
was no evidence before the Court as to the value of the home when Richards 
moved into the home in 1995 nor was there any evidence of its value when he 
moved out in August, 2005. Finally, there was no evidence as to the value of 
the house in 1991 when Brown acquired the home out of her prior divorce 
proceeding. (R. 238-239, Finding #26); 
z. While Richards presented evidence which was not disputed that he paid 
$71,100 in monthly payments toward the mortgage, $960.03 in home 
maintenance, $1,024.50 in lawn service, and $12,470 in other house expenses, 
the majority of which related to nearly $9,000.00 to construct a deck, in most 
cases the Court could not discern whether those expenses were incurred for 
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household improvements, or simply involved other expenses not related to an 
improvement to the house. (R. 239, Finding #27) 
aa. The Court reviewed the various items set forth in Exhibit 6-B and concluded 
that the expenditures for the deck ($8,800.00), and the expenditures for the 
purchase and installation of the swamp cooler, totaling $750.00, were 
improvements to the house, however, the Court could not reach the same 
conclusion for the majority of the other matters set forth on Exhibit 6-B. (R. 
240-241, Findings #28 & 29). 
67. Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court then entered the following 
Conclusions of Law: 
a. The home was clearly "premarital property" belonging to Brown. (R. 241, 
Conclusion #30); 
b. The parties never married, so there is no "marital estate" to divide. When the 
parties resolved the custody related issues and the Court granted partial 
summary judgment on the common law marriage claim, the case lost its 
character as a "domestic" case. However, because Richards asserted civil 
claims, the case proceeded to trial. In closing argument, Richards abandoned 
all claims except unjust enrichment and promissory estoppels. (R. 241-242, 
Conclusion No. 31); 
c. Richards is not entitled to any share of equity in the home, although the Court 
found he did set forth a claim for unjust enrichment. (R. 242, Conclusion No. 
32); 
d. After setting forth the elements of a claim for unjust enrichment, the Court 
concluded that the evidence supported a claim of unjust enrichment for the 
amount paid for the new deck ($8,895.00) and it would be unjust to permit 
Brown to retain that benefit without paying the cost thereof. (R. 242-243, 
Conclusion #33); 
e. In addition, the Court made the same finding with respect to the costs incurred 
for the purchase and installation of the swamp cooler ($750.00), sprinkler 
system expenditures ($312.00), and the purchase of a ceiling fan ($179.00) 
finding the total amount by which Brown was unjustly enriched to be 
$10,136.00. (R. 243, Conclusion #34); 
f. With respect to any other amounts, the Court found Richards failed to meet his 
burden of proof. (R. 243, Conclusion #35); 
g. The Court found it a closer issue whether Richards proved a right to make 
claim for mortgage payments, yet the Court found Richards may not recover 
any part of those payments. (R. 244, Conclusion #36); 
h. The Court found Richards would not have been entitled to recover the full 
amount of those payments because had he not been residing with Brown, he 
would have incurred a housing expense elsewhere. The Court was not able to 
22 
adequately determine what amount should be attributed to a fair rental value of 
the property. The best evidence before the Court was that prior to Richards 
moving in with Brown, she rented a portion of her house to a friend for 
$300.00 per month. Thereafter, Richards began paying $400 per month, then 
$550 and ultimately $650 per month. After moving out of the residence, 
Richards rented a housing unit for $750 per month. Thus, the Court concluded 
that the amounts he contributed each month approximated the reasonable rental 
value. (R. 244, Conclusion #37); 
i. The Court gave little credence to Richard statements that but for his 
understanding he was accruing equity in the residence, he would have made 
other choices financially. The Court found that no evidence was presented to 
the Court regarding his financial wherewithal to either pay a down payment or 
secure a mortgage. Richards took no action to secure his position, which the 
Court found suggests he was not in the position to do so. Therefore, the Court 
concluded it could not being to assess what portion of those payments could 
have created a partial equity interest for Richards. (R. 245, Conclusion #38); 
j . The Court concluded Richards failed to meet his burden of proof that any 
portion of the $71,100 in payment unjustly enriched Brown. (R. 245-246, 
Conclusion #39); 
k. The Court concluded the rest of the expenditures were normal living 
expenditures. (R. 246, Conclusion #40); 
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1. The Court then set forth the elements for promissory estoppels and concluded 
that Richards failed to meet his burden of proof with respect to those elements. 
The Court concluded that even if Richards met his burden with respect to 
Brown's promise to put him on title to the house, he failed to meet his burden 
with respect to the other two elements: reasonable reliance nor damage based 
on that reliance. (R. 246, Conclusion 41); 
m. The Court concluded there was no evidence that Richards acted prudently. 
The Court concluded that a reasonable person concerned about the security of 
his position with respect to equity in the house would have taken affirmative 
steps to protect that interest. In addition, the Court concluded there was no 
evidence presented to the Court that Richards suffered a loss. (R. 247, 
Conclusion #42); 
n. The Court concluded that Richards failed to meet his burden of proof that he 
conferred a benefit on Brown with respect to the vehicle and related expenses 
and therefore denied that claim. (R. 247-248, Conclusion #43); 
o. The Court concluded there was no basis for an award of attorney fees based on 
the claims of unjust enrichment or promissory estoppels. (R. 248-249, 
Conclusion #44 & 45); 
68. Based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court entered the 
following Order: 
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a. Petitioner's counsel was to prepare and submit for the Court's signature a final 
order and Determination of Paternity pursuant to the parties' stipulation. (R. 
250, Order #47); and 
b. With respect to all other issues addressed in this decision, the Court's Finding 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order shall be the final Order of the Court 
and no other form of order will need to be submitted by counsel. (R. 250, 
Order #48). 
69. Counsel for Richards, the Petitioner, never submitted the final order and 
determination of paternity pursuant to the parties' stipulation. 
70. Brown paid Richards the sum of $10,136.00 as ordered by the Court. (A copy of 
the payment and an Affidavit from the Title Company that the check cleared is 
attached hereto as Exhibit A and incorporated herein by this reference). 
71. Richards has not filed a satisfaction of judgment in the trial court. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Richards failed to marshal the evidence relating to all factual issues. Richards also 
waived his right to appeal based on acceptance of Brown's voluntary payment of the 
judgment. The Court correctly held that upon the end of the parties' cohabitation, their 
relationship terminated. The Court decided the issue as a matter of law, and therefore no 
evidentiary hearing was necessary. The Court properly granted the protective order 
based on the proximity to trial, the failure to comply with Rule 26(d), Utah R. Civ. P., 
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and Richards' Certificate of Readiness for Trial. The Court properly applied the correct 
legal standard on the claims of unjust enrichment. The Court properly distinguished 
home improvement expenses from maintenance expenses. Finally, Richards waived, 
stipulated or abandoned his claims relating to implied contract and constructive trust. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
RICHARDS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE 
With respect to all claims upon which Richards challenges the factual findings of 
the Court, it was his burden to marshal the evidence. In Interest ofK.F., 2009 UT 4. 
This obligation required Richards to provide this Court with all of the evidence which 
supported the trial court's decision. Id. Richards failed to meet his burden of 
marshalling. Therefore, this Court should deny his requests for relief. 
II. 
RICHARDS WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO APPEAL 
After the stipulation resolving the issues related to the parties' minor child, the 
only remaining issues related to monetary relief. After hearing all of the evidence and 
carefully considering that evidence, the Court concluded that with respect to the majority 
of his claims, Richards failed to meet his burden of proof. (R. 243, Conclusion #35; R. 
245-246, Conclusion #39; R. 246, Conclusion #41; R. 247-248, Conclusion #43). 
However, with respect to monies paid for capital improvements including a deck, ceiling 
fan, and swamp cooler, Richards met his burden of proof and was awarded a judgment in 
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the amount of $10,136.00. (R. 243, Conclusion #34). Thereafter, Brown paid the 
judgment in full. (Exhibit "A"). 
By accepting payment in full, Richards waived his right to appeal, rendering the 
issues on appeal moot. In Jensen v. Eddy, 30 Utah 2d 154, 514 P.2d 1142 (1973), the 
Court stated the general rule is that "if a judgment is voluntarily paid, which is accepted, 
and a judgment satisfied, the controversy has become moot and the right to appeal is 
waived." Id. At 157; see also West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Ca, 818 P.2d 1311, 1316 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991); Jacobsen, Morrin & Robbins Constr. Co. v. St. Joseph High Sch. 
Bd. Of Fin. Trs., 794 P.2d 505, 506 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Because Brown voluntarily 
paid the judgment and payment was accepted by Richards, he waived his right to appeal 
and rendered all monetary issues moot.1 
III. 
THE COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT UPON THE TERMINATON OF 
COHABITATION, THE RELATIONSHIP TERMINATED AS A MATTER OF 
LAW 
The Court correctly held for purposes of the statute of repose for the establishment 
and declaration of a common law marriage, the one year period to file after the 
termination of the relationship begins to run when the parties ceased cohabiting. 
Richards argues that the Court improperly overemphasized a single element, 
cohabitation, over all other elements. In fact, if any one element ceases to exist a 
common law marriage does not exist and therefore the relationship is terminated. While no 
1
 Brown admits there is no satisfaction of judgment in the record. 
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single factor is determinative in the trial court's analysis, and while "numerous factors 
should be considered," evidence proving each of the five statutory elements is essential. 
See Whyte v. Blair, 885 P.2d 791, 793 (Utah 1994). The parties must make a showing of 
capacity to marry, capacity to give consent, assumption of marital rights and duties, 
cohabitation, and a holding out as, and acquiring a uniform and general reputation as, 
husband and wife. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-l-4.5(l)(a)-(e) (1998). If any one of the 
elements is missing, the relationship is terminated for purposes of the statute of repose. 
The Court correctly found when the element of cohabitation no longer applied, the 
relationship was terminated and the statue of repose was triggered requiring the filing of 
the petition within one year of the termination of the relationship. 
While Utah law has not clearly settled this issue, there are cases which are 
relevant to the discussion. In In re Marriage ofKunz, 2006 UT App 151, 136 P.3d 1278, 
the Court addressed whether a petition was timely filed under UCA §30-1-4.5. In Kunz, 
the appellant argued that her petition was timely filed when it was brought within one 
year of her husband's death. Appellee argued that because the decedent was 
ceremonially married, upon his securing a marriage license, he was not longer legally 
capable of consenting to a common law marriage. Thus, the one year period commenced 
to run from the date the marriage license was issued. Implicitly, the Court ruled that 
upon the failure of any one element, the statute of repose was triggered and the movant 
had one year from that date to file a petition to establish the validity of the common law 
marriage. 
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Similarly, in Clark v. Clark, 2001 UT 44, 27 P.3d 538, the Court found that the 
parties cohabited until they permanently separated on August 28, 1996. A few months 
later, the Petitioner filed her action to establish a marriage. On appeal, the trial court's 
decision was affirmed based on its finding that the parties ceased cohabiting, and 
therefore their relationship terminated, within one year of the filing of the petition to 
establish the marriage and for a resulting divorce. The instant case is similar to Clark. In 
the instant case, the Court found the parties permanently separated in late August, or 
early September, 2005. (R. 229, Finding #3). Richards did not file his Petition until 
December, 2006. Therefore, the Court ruled the Petition was not timely filed based on 
the date of the parties' permanent separation being the best evidence of the termination of 
their relationship. 
In Bunch v. Bunch, 906 P.2d 918 (Utah App. 1995), the Court considered 
whether a petition was filed within one year of the termination of the relationship. In 
Bunch, the parties separated in August 1990, and the petitioner filed her action in May, 
1991. On a Motion to Dismiss, the Court granted the motion based on the failure to file 
within one year of the termination of the relationship, i.e. the parties' separation in 
August 1990. On appeal, the trial court was affirmed. 
The foregoing supports the trial court's conclusion that upon the cessation of 
cohabitation, the statute of repose began to run. Richards had one year from that date, 
August or September, 2005. Richards failed to timely file the petition, doing so more 
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than one year after the termination of the parties, the Court properly granted partial 
summary judgment to Brown. 
IV 
THE COURT DID NOT NEED TO HOLD AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON 
THE ISSUE OF WHEN THE RELATIONSHIP TERMINATED 
No evidentiary hearing needed to be held on the question of when the parties' 
relationship terminated because there were no genuine issues of material fact, and the 
determination of when the relationship terminated was a question of law. As such, the 
trial court was proper in deciding the issue on summary judgment. 
Prior to the filing of the Motion for Summary Judgment, the record contained the 
following relevant statements: 
a. Richard's Verified Petition: (1) "Petitioner and Respondent have never been 
married . . . " (R. 1, %L); (2) "The parties cohabited since at least May 1995 
until their separation in earl 2006 . . . " (R. 3, Tfl4); (3) "The parties cohabited 
together from at least May 1995 until early 2006." (R. 5, |23); 
b. Affidavit of Steve Richards2: "We have resided together since May 1995 on a 
continuous basis until separating initially in the fall of 2005 and on a 
permanent basis in January 2006." (R. 13, [^3); 
c. Affidavit of Diana Brown in Support of Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment: (1) "We cohabitated and stayed in the same room together until the 
summer of 2001 at which time the romantic aspects of the relationship fully 
deteriorated." (R. 83, f 5); (3) "During the summer of 2001, after effectively 
severing all romantic aspects of our relationship, we moved into separate 
bedrooms. I resided in the upstairs master bedroom and the Petitioner resided 
in the main floor guest bedroom." (R. 83, |6); (4) "We no longer had any sort 
of sexual relationship or any romantic relationship after the summer of 2001." 
(R. 83, %7); and (5) "The Petitioner moved out of the 12th Avenue home at the 
2
 Richards Affidavit was filed in support of his Motion for Temporary Orders. 
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end of August 2005 and took up reside] i^  f r - " « ; 
to reside;" (R. 83^8); 
< response to Respondent's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment3: i % \ i he 
parties have one child together, namely Stephanie A. Brown-Richards (DOB 
3/29/96) and cohabited for approximately ten years from May 1995 until 
Petitioner moved out of Respondent's home in approximately September 
2005." (R. 87, f 1); and (2) 'The Petitioner states in his Verified petition -
Paternity and Related Matters that he considered his separation from 
Respondent to be in early 2006 under UCA 30-1 -4.5(l)(c)." (R. 88, P ) . 
While Brown supported her motion for partial summary judgrru t 
.,». , . achards faik\i u» ul<. a counter affidavit. Rule 56(e), Utah Rules uf Civil 
Procedure clearlv-<tat/s. 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided .. 
rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the 
pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this ink 
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for tria 
Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to :'e 
such a response. 
;v..i. :MSU - ( iv P Because Richards did not file an affidavit in opposition to the 
mo' • • d;:' ,;, . ^ properly supported by Brown's affidavit, there 
was no genuine issue of material fact. 
While it is undisputed that based on the clear language of the rule Richards 
faik ' *.• > -• *• v , * * - I - . - . ;.;. 'nrougii uliiig iii> own counter affidavit, 
Brown acknowledges the existence of a Verified i; 
Richa rds did no t file an affidavit in opposi t ion lo I In. i1 , P* I i ( iu .n I Summary 
Judgment. 
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filed in support of his motion for temporary orders. (R. 1 and R. 13 respectively). 
Despite the clarity of the rule, in Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696 (Utah 1985), the 
Court acknowledged that in some cases, a verified petition may satisfy the rule's 
requirement. Id. At 699. In determining whether a verified petition meets that 
requirement, the Pentecost court stated a "verified pleading, made under oath and 
meeting the requirements for affidavits established in Rule 56(e). . . can be considered 
the equivalent of an affidavit for purposes of a motion for summary judgment." Id. In 
Pentecost, the Court found the verified pleading failed to meet the requirements of Rule 
56(e) because rather than stating the facts were true and correct, it merely verified the 
pleading. Id. In addition, it impermissibly qualified the personal knowledge with 
statements relating to "information" and "belief. Id. Finally, some of the statements 
were not facts at all but rather assumptions or conclusions. Id. 
Based on the standard set forth in Pentecost, one must review the documents on 
file first against that standard. After making that determination, each of the documents 
must be viewed as they relate to the specific factual averments contained Brown's 
affidavit. A review of these documents based on these standards evidences a lack of 
genuine issue of material fact. 
First, Richards conceded that he moved out of the residence in September 2005. 
(R. 87, f 1). While Brown stated he moved out in August 2005 (R. 83, ^8), this factual 
dispute of a single month was not material to the Court's determination because 
regardless of what date the court accepted, it would not alter its decision. 
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Second, Richards did not rely on hi^ a — • >• * * : \ :.. u: r 
temporary orders in responding to the motion for summary judgment. It is not mentioned 
in iir, o-sponse. 
Third, Richards did rely on hi^  V uiinl iViiii. in ,|n
 ( itiealk sialing IVtituner 
states in his Verified petition for Paternity and Related Matters that he considers 1 Ins 
separation (lorn KosponJiiJ to be in caiiv 2006." (R. 88,^3). However, in so doing, he 
did not provide the Court with any specific ivK'PMi' i" in an\ paragraph in the verified 
petition. Further, the statement is the equivalent not to a statement of f ;n I 
>econu. .... Venfied Petition suffers from the same deficiencies which were 
present in Pentea)sl 1 < i. • 11; 11»1 s \ o i i 11 *i s 111 o i• 11111 t1 Ioc 11111ciI I, not merely the factual 
assertions contained therein The verification is subject to th 
.- i-anon .i;id " belie;. l-'inally, the only relevant allegation in the verified petition is 
a hybrid statement of fin I anil i out lusit HI I !'•"", \, || I 11 As such, Ihe veri.fi.ed petition does 
not meet the requirements of Rule 56(e), Utah R. ("iv I\ 
Assuming arguendo verified petition could be properly considered, it 
nonetheless r< ' ' » • -** • -! .:*r.: . ;\i< tactual assertions contained in 
Brown's affidavit. The verified petition did not rebi itllio farr, iluil in iln, 'iiimmei «, I 
200 .:, i omaniic aspects of the relationship terminated, including all sexual relations. 
(R. 83, fU5 iK'd p '^tili. :.,:i
 teu., ;i - ;act that Richards moved out of 
Brown^ house m August 2005. (R. 83,*'8i. Th^n ^ , - J - - -
 ;ot 
create a genuine issue of material fact which would have precluded summary judp' - r t. 
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Without a genuine issue of material fact, there was absolutely no basis for the Court to 
hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue of when cohabitation. 
Without a question of fact, the Court properly granted summary judgment. The 
issue before the Court was whether the petition was timely filed. While it may have 
required the consideration of some underlying facts, the ultimate determination on the 
timeliness of filing under the common law marriage, the statute of repose is a question of 
law. See Nolan v. Hoopiiaina, 2006 UT 53, \ 19, 144 P.3d 1129; Russell Packard Dev., 
Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14,f18, 108 P.3d 741. Gramlich v. Munsey, 838 P.2d 1131, 
1132 (Utah 1992); and McKean v. McBride, 884 P.2d 1314, 1316-17 (Utah App. 1994), 
cert, denied, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995). Therefore, the Court correctly decided the issue 
as a matter of law without holding an evidentiary hearing. 
V. 
THE COURT PROPERLY GRANTED THE PROTECTIVE ORDER 
Contrary to Richards's assertions, the trial court properly granted the protective 
order. It is without question that the trial court has the right to limit discovery. In 
reviewing such questions, this Court applies an abuse of discretion standard. Cannon v. 
Salt Lake Reg'l Med Or., 2005 UT App 352, f 7, 121 P.3d 74. 
In the instant case, the trial court granted Brown's protective order and denied 
Richards the right to pursue discovery. The basis of this decision was not only the 
proximity of the requests to the date of trial, but Richards's failure to comply with the 
clear dictates of Rule 26(d), Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 26(d) is crystal clear: 
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(d) Sequence and timing of discovery. Except for cases exenh i t^ut; M.« »di 
(a)(2), except as authorized under these rules, or unless otherw i^ e stipulatea L\ :;K 
unities or ordered by the court, a party may not seek discovery from any source 
..•-.-• TC the parties have met and conferred as required by subJi\ ision «r 
Rule 26(d), UtahR. Civ. P Oespitr lu\ IIIJJ, been spa ilic'ill1, \ KICIVJ o> ux \ ourtfo do 
so, Richards failed to initiate an attorney planning conference to con vr -
• ». J and therefore was not entitled to discovei v i U. :
 ; While not a 
basis for the Co* + ? 'is .HI iiliiilit u.il lusi 1 - - .: p T? hit vk\ «-ion was Richards 
filing of his Certificate of Readiness for Trial wherein he affir -•'• • •-!•• tlle 
('"*Mid that all discovery had been completed. rP • 39-140). 
ThetiLi! (Hiiil in n .I, rw'iviscd lis disuc; :, m granting the protective oidci 
With trial two weeks away and the complete failure * 
Richards certificate of readiness for trial containing his affirmative representation 
thai all dlsrm >•>.
 :... court did not abuse its discretion. 
> 1 . 
11IE COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED THE LEGAL STANDARD OF UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT 
.ivi^ iiards incomrll1' n««ii<" • I•• • i -;K . > apj\v the correct legal 
standard for a claim of unjust enrichment, iu die contrary, the Court convclh ' Jippliv'd 
tr.v. iK.vy ,!nc.: , .A^\ correctly determined that Richards failed to meet his burden of 
proof. 
The elements for a claim of unjust enrichment are M t ..:'<* • 
P K I : : : , ( /„. -M These three elements include: 
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(1) A benefit conferred upon one person by another; 
(2) An appreciation or knowledge by the conferee of the benefits; 
(3) The acceptance or retention of the benefit under circumstances as to 
make it inequitable for the conferee to retain the benefit without payment of 
its value. 
Id. In its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, the Court correctly set forth 
these elements. (R. 242-243, Conclusion #33). 
Richards' arguments concerning this issue miss the point. Richards simply 
failed to meet his burden of proof. Richards makes the conclusory statement that 
Richards' payments toward the mortgage over a ten year period clearly conferred a 
benefit upon Brown. However, at trial, Richards failed to provide the court with any 
evidence which allegedly quantified that benefit. For instance, Richards could have 
presented the Court with an amortization schedule from the lender establishing the 
amount of interest and principal which was paid during the parties' relationship. He 
could have presented evidence as to what percentage of that interest and principal 
reduction was attributable to his payments. By so doing, he could have shown that he 
possibly conferred a benefit upon Brown. However, Richards failed to provide the Court 
with this evidence. It was not the trial court's misapplication of the law which defeated 
Richards' claim, it was his failure to meet his burden of proof. 
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Richards further argues that Brown had . S was 
being conferred upon her by Richards, To the extent that Brown knew Richards was 
makiiiu p.«\ • ,.c L* using expense, this is not disputed. 
Finally, Richards argues that under Ihe \ irriinI^I.UH I *« il \\ \ mid he inequitable to 
permit Brown to retain that benefit without compensation to Richards. Richards further 
.;. _»n - : * : representations concerning adding him to the title which 
equates to the inequitable circumstances 7 ^ M . ••; \ .njust 
enrichment as it relates to the mortgage payments, i acre are two prubki . -
. i, w. w:.. . re was no meeting of the minds by the parties concerning putting 
Richards on title, as it w "^  '• !<••-.•.• . us>io); -A \YX\ no detail, (Tr. 
P 50. 51. and r":) Brown testified that at all times, any discussion 
• i- .,: . ii;^.,, vied i4 requirement that he pay her one half of the equit) wincl; was 
m the property as a \ midilinn pivcednil lo |>i111111j• limi on Mile |Ti , I1 l,'/\ L 16-19 and 
P. 98, L. 7-13) Based on these conflicting statements about th< i? '^ . .* v r t 
I'oinjeninig putting Richards on trial, there was no meeting of the minds. 
The C\ v.* • „vr .-muled to recover the full amount 
of those payments because had he not been residing with It in. n lir w uM (i,,,i" in nil .1 
a »•.. nig expense elsewhere. The Court was r>^i Me u> adequately determine what 
amount should be attribi • .u property. The best evidence 
before the Court was that prior to Richards moving in v ifli Un w\ n, Jn ivntal a p» I'm i of 
her liouse to a friend for $300.00 per month. Thereafter, Richards began paying $400 per 
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month, then $550 and ultimately $650 per month. After moving out of the residence, 
Richards rented a housing unit for $750 per month. Thus, the Court concluded that the 
amounts he contributed each month approximated the reasonable rental value. (R. 244, 
Conclusion #37). 
The Court gave little credence to Richard statements that but for his understanding 
he was accruing equity in the residence, he would have made other choices financially. 
The Court found that no evidence was presented to the Court regarding his financial 
wherewithal to either pay a down payment or secure a mortgage. Richards took no action 
to secure his position, which the Court found suggests he was not in the position to do so. 
Therefore, the Court concluded it could not being to assess what portion of those 
payments could have created a partial equity interest for Richards. 
The Court concluded Richards failed to meet his burden of proof that any portion 
of the $71,100 in payment unjustly enriched Brown. (R. 245-246, Conclusion #39). It 
was not a misapplication of the law, it was a failure on Richards part to prove his case. 
As such, this Court should affirm the decision of the trial court. 
VII 
THE COURT PROPERLY DISTINGUISHED BETWEEN HOME 
IMPROVEMENT AND MAINTENANCE EXPENSES 
The trial court properly distinguished home improvement expenses and 
maintenance expenses. Richards' argument is that he was entitled not only to restitution 
for the payments he made but also for appreciation on those payments. After considering 
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the matters before it, the Court essentially found Richn • . • - • , . . »::?;.:; >ed 
.MI is^ iixtua N !ic paid for which attached to the property (i.e. the deck, swamp cooler, 
and ceiling f> ; n ten ance expenses (i,e lawn care service). ThU 
distinction is significant. The Court found Rich egardmg a 
benefit being conferred upon Brown only with respect to those fixtures for which 
H ii hards f\,u l 11 >w n u „ Hit: li Ml *•» nil t found with respect to all other expenditures 
relating to the care or maintenance o*" f h< *< .»^.. ..x • a * burden of 
proof. (R. 243, Conclusion 34 and 35), Flxus, the Court correctly distinguish*-! / 
lirhwrn fixtuu's \ cisus routine maintenance, but more importantly those items for which 
Richards did and did not meet 1 
VIII 
R T CORRECTLY RULED ON ALL CLAIMS RELAIING TO BOTH 
THE MORTGAGE PAYMENTS AND EQUITY CI. \IMS 
The Court correctly ruled on Richards failnl d» m. , I Ins, Imtdni nl proot Willi 
respect to the claims based on his payments applied toward the mortgage, his claim lor 
€-• . a ^ .amiN lur a division of the appreciation in the 
residence. As such, this Court should a PI . *% >; .. . 
It is undisputed that Richards paid part of the monthly mortgage payment dunny 
hi1* Vn \("ii pen I i li'ilultiijiiiiiiii w nli Brown, However, based on the totality of the 
evidence, the trial court ruled that Rich,mi* \* -T >!'»( eninli d m u* MUI any »>) the 
mortgage payments he paid, nor any interest in the property. 
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The Court found that no evidence was presented to the Court regarding his 
financial wherewithal to either pay a down payment or secure a mortgage. Richards took 
no action to secure his position, which the Court found suggests he was not in the 
position to do so. Therefore, the Court concluded it could not being to assess what 
portion of those payments could have created a partial equity interest for Richards. (R. 
245, Conclusion #38). 
The Court concluded Richards failed to meet his burden of proof that any portion 
of the $71,100 in payment unjustly enriched Brown. (R. 245-246, Conclusion #39). 
Because Richards failed to meet his burden of proof, the Court correctly ruled he was not 
entitled to any reimbursement for any part of the mortgage payments Richards paid. In 
addition, the Court ruled as a matter of law that unjust enrichment is a restitutionary 
claim for relief. Emergency Physicians Integrated Care v. Salt Lake County, 2007 UT 
72,110, 167 P.3d 1080. 
In addition, the trial court correctly ruled that appreciation is not an allowable 
measure of damages based on a claim for unjust enrichment. As stated over fifty years 
ago in the case of Bough v. Darley, 112 Utah 1, 184 P.2d 335, 339 (1947), M[I]n an 
action for unjust enrichment, in those cases where there is a proper equitable basis for the 
same, the measure of damages, by the great weight of authority, is the reasonable value of 
the services rendered." Applying the same to a claim for unjust enrichment based on 
payment for fixtures attached to real property, the measure of damages is the reasonable 
value of fixture, not the appreciated value of the property to which it is affixed. Finally, 
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there was siinph no evidence before the trial court ^m.;.1 . ,:o\* : . . -. ese 
fixtures increased the value of the property. Thus, there was nothing upon which the 
Court - n i<! • - cost of the fixtures. 
IX 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND RICHARDS FAILED TO MEET 
HIS BURDEN OF PROOF ON HIS CLAIM OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL 
Thelii*!'— • * .'.•.. .*-. ;:a to meet his ^urden of proof on 
the claim of promissory estoppel. This Court should affm .. r. 
The Curt >; onclusions set forth the elements for promissory estoppel and 
concluded th; : ' : *• ; * • uracil of proof with respect to those elements. 
The Court concluded that even if Richards m«*i ! - v. .1. s 
promise to put him on title to the house, he failed to meet his burden with respeel in 1I1 
* . ' • ' * , «• •• ,wc reliance or damage based on that reliance. (R. 24(», 
Conclusion 4 i;. 
First, Richards failed to marshal the evidence in support of the Cor" •> t 
his i Iiaiitv w ww in'il leasonablc and that he was not damaged as a result of what he 
alleged was his reliance. Second, Richards ^ *• . • -. . e argument 
relating to promissory estoppel. As such, this Court should not consider the *s-u ? ? *\"' 
Rid*' f ;. J.LWJ. uuii in> testimony was more credible than the 
testimony of Brown elevated to a he i uh • M • . ; i \ ; • ; ^ o n d u c t 
reasonable. Such is not the case. Without question, the Court has tlv,- r-ji 
• ^ - . ^
;
 icg.irak v> xA what testimony it found more credible, on the quantum of 
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evidence before it. Where that quantum of evidence fails to satisfy the burden of proof, it 
must deny the claim. With respect to the claim of promissory estoppel, the Court 
correctly found that Richards failed to meet that burden of proof. This fact was admitted 
by Richards counsel when she conceded there was no evidence presented concerning 
some of the elements of promissory estoppel. (Tr. P. 163, L. 4-16). 
The Court concluded there was no evidence that Richards acted prudently. The 
Court concluded that a reasonable person concerned about the security of his position 
with respect to equity in the house would have taken affirmative steps to protect that 
interest. In addition, the Court concluded there was no evidence presented to the Court 
that Richards suffered a loss. (R. 247, Conclusion #42). 
These conclusions, based on the evidence before the Court, must be affirmed. 
X 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO CONSIDER RICHARDS 
CLAIMS OF BOTH IMPLIED CONTRACT AND CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST 
The trial court properly refused to consider Richards' claims of both implied 
contract and constructive trust. Richards specifically waived his pursuit of those claims 
in closing argument. (R. 241-242, Conclusion No. 31). Richards stipulated that he failed 
to prove any form of constructive trust or implied contract. Richards waived or 
abandoned those claims. Therefore, he cannot now claim error when he induced that 
conduct by the trial court. 
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In addition to the foregoing Richard^ IV.1 '" ; -. ssues to this 
Court. As such, this Court should not consider the arguments. 
STATEMENT OF RELIEF REQUESTED 
This Court should deny all relief rn]iii'slni I In Uu h.in I In uldilmn, lliisiuiirt 
should award Brown her cost and attorney fees in having to dciend against tin , ,ippi il 
('iiNcmsioN 
Richard failed to marshal the evidence relating to all factual, issiies R idiiinls ;ilso 
w iii\ a\ Ins i i;>ln in appeal based on acceptance of Brown's voluntary payment of the 
n^ iiL. me Li:' " • f • ' . e j arties cohabitation, their 
relationship terminated. The Court decided the issue as i i \, • • » 
evidentiary hearing was necessary. The Court properly granted the protective order 
based on ilu; r • •  • n
 Tlp.\ with Rule 26(d), Utah R. Ch F , 
and Richards certificate of readiness for trial. TheCniirl prnp-'rh <H'Pli J llie roiia I 
legal standard on the claims of unjust enrichment. The Court properly distinguished 
home improvement expenses from maintenance expenses. Finally, Richards waived, 
stipulated or abandoned his claims relating to implied 
1 m v ourt should affirm the decision of the trial court. 
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Respectfully submitted this / day of April, 2009. 
T i n ^ p / a n Dijk>- - - "' 








DIA IN A BROWN, 
Respondent/App* Ike. Case (No, 21)080682 
AFFIDAVIT OF MARY JANE JOHNSON 
TINEKE VAN DDK, 6049 
P.O. BOX 0992 
MIDVALE, UTAH 84047 
(801) 347-0465 
Attorney for Respondent \ppeihv 
S T \ 11: U i ', ' I A i l \ ^ • •' 
; ss 
County of Salt Lake ) 
Mary Jane Johnson, having been duly sworn, states and alleges as follows: 
1. 'I ,ini '"'"iil.ii";,, l.ijk- jnidisuii, Ill</Accounting Director at Founders Title 
Company. 
2, On October 6, 2008 check number 24078 was issued to Steve Richards 
Jorpiivment in1]" f ender'Rnovn !ii HI. l!n; founders i • * Company Trust Account # 7. 
The check was in the amount of $ 10, <^ 
1 
4. The check cleared the Trust Account on October 22, 2008. 
DATED this /b0_ day of YVLdAok/ of 2009. 
^ 7 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ' ^ - ^ 
Mary Jane yol^son, fJ 
HR/Accounting Director 
Founders Title Company 
IJM 
Subscribed and sworn to before me, a Notary Public, this l j 
'A 




746 E.WINCHESTER ST. STE100 





j W £ 8 _ Che^^" 7 7) f l m n i m , i U,13 6.UO 
acoaaar 
FOUND£RS VTIB COMPANY ^ / l ^ , ;£._ 
a S S S k n**©* -sKSKs. 
240TR 
DATS 
1OW2O08 TEN THOUSAND ONE HUHDRfJD IT11RTY-S1X DOLLARS AND NO TENTS 
foxHC STEVE RICHAKDS ' - ' 
gyDCR PAYMENT PER LENQER/OROWf J *~ " £j 
AMOUNT 
I'JLmii id 
'•02i,0<7fl«* •: i 51.30 i?50 3i:t« JL Olflfl*? »*«• 
V'7 
•'•oao to i ]fi on/ 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
ihis is to certify that on the _/_ day of April, 2009,1 hand delivered a true and 
coireel copy of the foregoing document to the person named below: 
Suzanne Marelius 
261 East 300 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, TIT 84111 
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